Rules of evidence and what police must say and do during the arrest process have been an area of concern for the U.S. Supreme Court more or less since the founding of the Nation. The words “you have the right to remain silent” have been a staple of police TV dramas and movies ever since the Supreme Court formulated specific language to be used in custodial arrest procedures in the Miranda v. Arizona (1966).
Ever since that landmark case, the Court has been clarifying and, in some respects, scaling back its decision — laying out instances where confessions can be used even when Miranda rights have not been read.
In the May 2011 issue on J.D.B. V. North Carolina, we look at the rights of minors during police questioning and whether where this questioning takes place (in this case, at the suspect’s school) and whether the suspect understands that he is free to end the interrogation makes a difference in whether a subsequent confession is admissible in court. It is just one of the multiple instances during the 14-year history of Supreme Court Debates that we’ve extensively covered the Court’s evolving interpretation of Miranda and other issues surrounding police searches and interrogations. Here are a few:
In Berghuis v. Thompkins, which we covered in the October 2010 issue, the Supreme Court held that a suspect has to actively invoke his right to remain silent in order for police questioning to end. Simply not speaking, even if for an extending period of time, isn’t enough to terminate the interrogation.
In April 2004, we looked at the first time the Court took on the topic of interrogating juveniles, in the case of Alvarado v. Yarborough. Although the case dealt with similar issues to J.D.B., the suspect was older — 17, not 13 — and the issue was whether Court precedent was sufficiently established to allow a Federal appeals court to step in and overturn a State court decision (the Supreme Court ruled that it wasn’t).
A congressional attempt to overturn Miranda requirements and allow judges to consider a variety of evidence when deciding whether a suspect’s confession should be admissible was at issue in Dickerson v. United States, which we covered in September 2000. Although the law in question had been on the books for over 30 years, it was largely ignored until 1999, when the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals cited it as grounds for allowing a confession that a lower court thrown out due to a lack of proper Miranda notification. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and upheld the Miranda decision.
Ever since Miranda was decided, there have been those who argue that the case went too far — that the previous practice of giving judges greater latitude in determining what did or did not constitute a valid confession was a better practice that provided for more effective law enforcement efforts. A look at cases like Dickerson, Alvarado, Thopmkins, and J.D.B. shows that while there may be some sympathy on the Court for these arguments, the foundation of Miranda is still strong.
